To Hayek L: Introduction to Hayek-L Seminar, John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2002).
From: Linda Raeder
Date: May 11, 2003
Hello All:
Like most good classical liberals, I long held a very sympathetic view of John Stuart Mill. I particularly admired the powerful and classic evocation of individual liberty of his justly famed essay On Liberty. While casting about for a Ph.D. dissertation topic, someone casually mentioned that no one as yet had written an exhaustive study of Mill's religious thought. I immediately sensed an affinity for such a project, regarding it as a continuation of my long-standing interest in the development of the liberal tradition. Hayek's interest in this fascinating figure further whetted my own. In short, I embarked upon my Mill project with a quite favorable impression of Mill, merely intending to elaborate his religious thought and deepen my understanding of the liberal tradition in the process. I had no idea what a scholarly goldmine I would inadvertently hit upon! The manuscript was almost immediately accepted for publication and the work emerged into print in a relatively effortless manner.
Mill is widely regarded as a quintessentially "secular" thinker and most accounts of his thought make at least a passing reference to his ethical "naturalism." What I discovered is that such accounts fail to grasp the nature and significance of Mill's enterprise. Mill is very far from the "secularism" generally ascribed to him, if by "secular" is meant a relative disinterest in or indifference to religious or theological concerns. (Hayek I regard as a truly secular thinker.) Mill, by contrast, was obsessed with religion. Indeed, I argue that Mill should most properly be regarded, not as a representative of secular liberalism, but as a religious thinker and indeed as a religious founder (the so-called "religion of secular humanism"). Religious preoccupations governed Mill's thought and structured his endeavors from first to last, and, as his private correspondence makes clear, his published writings cannot be understood without an awareness of their subterranean religious intent. It is not too much to say that Mill's chief mission throughout his public career was religious, and two-pronged: to undermine traditional religious beliefs, especially Christianity as he understood it; and to establish in its place a new "secular," "social," and even "political" religion, what he, following Comte, called the Religion of Humanity. Mill was not remotely interested in fostering a "secular" society, but in establishing a new social order religiously oriented by an all-encompassing and obligatory "service to Humanity," a service "confined to the limits of the earth" and regarded as nothing less than the "law of our lives." One once apprehends this unifying religious purpose, much of the notorious inconsistency of Mill's writings evaporates. All of his writing aimed to further his religious mission as characterized.
Further, Mill's project has considerable significance for the development of Anglo-American liberalism. The "purely human"/ "social" ethos he championed has been widely assimilated by Anglo-American consciousness. Such an ethos has fueled in large part the rise of that curious hybrid of "modern liberalism," a "liberalism" that seeks to promote individual liberty (in some sense) while employing the distinctly illiberal means of Big Government. Mill's endeavor to replace "theological" with "purely human" morality is also significant insofar as western constitutionalism is bound up with the belief in a law higher than the mere enactments of man. Constitutionalism, certainly within the American political tradition, has long been dependent upon the belief in a moral order that transcends human preference, in the belief in an objective order of justice, traditionally conceived as having its source in a transcendent god. Mill, whose lifelong aim was to establish a "purely human" source of moral obligation, aimed to eviscerate this tradition. The Millian project thus raises an important issue: can the classical-liberal order, i.e., government limited in the interest of securing individual liberty, survive the demise of belief in an objective higher law and the related demise in a conviction of the inviolability of the individual, whose profound significance derived, within our tradition, from man's transcendent source and end. In short, can a "purely human" ethic oriented toward an ultimate "service to Humanity," as Mill championed, suffice to preserve the value of the individual and the limited government that serves to secure that value politically? Experience seems to be suggesting otherwise.
Finally, I should also add that my evaluation of Mill altered considerably throughout the course of my study. Mill, whom even Hayek hailed as a "great moral figure," failed, on my view, to adhere to the standards of integrity one would expect of a self-styled philosopher and moral sage. As is clear from Mill's private correspondence, he engaged throughout his life in subterfuge, attempting indirectly through his published writings to undermine Christianity while simultaneously leading his readers to embrace his own new religion. Such a strategy is worthy perhaps of a Marx, but not of a thinker lionized as "mentor to the world." Yet Mill too seems to have regarded philosophy as a mere tool of social and political reform. Perhaps this is his greatest offense.
Related issues raised by a study of Mill's religious thought and aspirations:
1. Is "the idea of Humanity capable of replacing that of God" in Western society, as Mill insisted? (See Chapter 2, "The Spirit of the Age," Chapter 3, "Nature" and "Utility of Religion," Chapter 5, "Theism," and Chapter 8, "Consequences and Implications")
2. How does one reconcile Mill's passionate defense of individual liberty in On Liberty and his equally passionate advocacy for the intense socialization of the populace-"from infancy"-toward the ethos embodied in the Religion of Humanity? (See Chapter 2, " "The Spirit of the Age," Chapter 6, On Liberty, and Chapter 7, Utilitarianism)
3. The innerworldly object of Mill's Religion of Humanity-the "improvement" and indeed "regeneration" of the world-suggests a collapse of the traditional western distinction between the temporal sphere of politics and the spiritual sphere of religion. Does not Mill's investment of quasi-religious value in social reform present the danger of a divinized politics, of the resacralization of the state? More generally, does not Mill's 'social religion' rest in uneasy tension with the classical-liberal elements of his thought? (See Chapter 1, "Early Influences: James Mill and Jeremy Bentham," Chapter 8, "Consequences and Implications")
4. Why have Mill's religious thought and aspirations--so significant for a proper evaluation of his corpus--received relatively little scholarly attention over the past century-plus?
5. Is Mill's conception of god-limited, probable, greatly in need of man's assistance-persuasive, useful, reliable, fantastic. . . .? (See Chapter 5, "Theism")
6. Is a consequentialist ethic of the kind advocated by Mill compatible with the preservation of the Rule of Law as conceived by Hayek? When an action is judged moral or immoral on the basis of its social consequences (its contribution to the "collective happiness"), and not on its inherent rightness or wrongness, does not justice inevitably move in the direction of an outcome-based (distributive) justice? (See Chapter 7, "Utilitarianism," and Chapter 8, "Consequences and Implications")
Thanks for your interest,
Linda Raeder